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THE OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION
INTRODUCTION
By enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),1 Congress created the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS") to replace the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
("FHLBB").2 Dissatisfied with the state of the thrift industry as regu-
lated by the FHLBB, Congress created the OTS exclusively for the pur-
pose of regulating the thrift industry,3 and expected the strong hand of
the OTS to provide stability for the thrifts.' In order to carry out its
mission, the OTS is vested with broad powers. These powers enable the
OTS to impose specific requirements upon the thrifts to ensure their safe
operation and to minimize the threat to the thrift industry's deposit in-
surance fund.5 Furthermore, the OTS' enforcement powers allow it to
prevent non-complying thrifts from continuing to violate these
standards.6
Part I of this Note examines the FHLBB, the predecessor of the OTS,7
and describes how Congress intended the OTS to remedy some of the ills
giving rise to the savings and loan ("S&L") crisis. These causes include
the inadequate supervision of the thrift industry and the apparent conflict
of interest between the FHLBB and the Federal Savings & Loan Insur-
ance Corporation ("FSLIC").8 Part II presents an overview of the OTS,
describing its duties, powers and day-to-day operations-and examines
some of the litigation in which the OTS is currently involved.'" This
Note concludes that, its detractors notwithstanding, the OTS remains a
necessary regulatory body that can continue to supervise the thrift indus-
try effectively.1
I. THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE PRIOR TO THE OTS
A. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
1. Formation of the FHLBB
In 1932, Congress formed the FHLBB as an agency of the federal gov-
ernment 2 by enacting the Federal Home Loan Bank Act ("FHLBA").' 3
1. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified in various
sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
2. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 89-123 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-150 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 151-171 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
12. See 12 U.S.C. § 1437(b) (1988).
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The FHLBB consisted of a three-member panel appointed by the Presi-
dent with the approval of the Senate.14 These members served four-year
terms, with one member designated by the President as chairman.15
Congress authorized the FHLBB to regulate all S&Ls that made long-
term home mortgage loans and were members of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System.1 6 Additionally, with the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
("HOLA"), Congress authorized the FHLBB to charter and regulate
federal thrifts1 through a system consisting of twelve regional Federal
Home Loan Banks. 8 The statute mandated that the Federal Home
Loan Banks be owned by FSLIC-insured thrift institutions,'9 with each
thrift being required to own stock in its regional bank.20 Thus, each Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank served as a central credit facility as well as a sec-
ondary liquidity source.2"
2. Powers of the FHLBB
The FHLBB's regulatory powers were similar to but less far-reaching
than those now possessed by the OTS.22 The FHLBB could organize,
incorporate, examine, operate, and regulate federal savings and loan as-
sociations.2" The FHLBB also supervised and regulated the twelve Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks that provided credit and other services to the
13. Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1421
et seq).
14. See 12 C.F.R. § 500.10 (1989).
15. See id.
16. See Clark, et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Federal Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. Law. 1013, 1017 (1990). [here-
inafter Regulation of Savings Associations].
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 1461, 1464(a) (1988).
18. See id. § 1423 (1988). These regional banks were located in Atlanta, Boston, Chi-
cago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Des Moines, Indianapolis, New York, Pittsburgh, San Fran-
cisco, Seattle and Topeka. See Adams & Peck, The Federal Home Banks and the Home
Finance System, 43 Bus. Law. 833, 833 (1988). The Federal Home Loan Banks were
established for two main purposes-first, to provide member thrifts with below-market
loans to further the housing-finance mission, see H.R. Rep. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 453, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code & Admin. News 86, 149 [hereinafter House
Report], and second, to supervise and examine the member thrifts. The president of each
district served as the main supervisory agent and had the power to decide on applications
from member thrifts and to enforce federal laws and regulations. See id.
19. See id.
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 1426(a) (1988). The number of shares a thrift institution was
required to buy was based on the level of investment the thrift held in residential mort-
gages and on the thrift's Federal Home Loan Bank advances. See id. § 1426(c)(l)-(2)
(1988).
21. See Savings Institution Sourcebook 15 (1984).
22. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 16, at 1028. For a discussion of
the OTS' regulatory powers, see infra notes 56-100 and accompanying text.
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988). The FHLBB lacked authority over state-
chartered savings associations, however. The regulations and authority of these state-
chartered savings associations was most often determined by state law. See Regulation of
Savings Associations, supra note 16, at 1018.
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S&Ls.24 The FHLBB had authority, for example, to issue cease-and-
desist orders against associations that engaged in unsound or unsafe busi-
ness practices,' and could also place an institution in conservatorship or
receivership. 2
6
Through its role as administrator of the FSLIC, the FHLBB insured
deposits in FSLIC-insured thrifts.2 7 Congress empowered the FSLIC to
insure accounts placed in both federal savings associations and some fed-
eral savings banks.'e The FSLIC also insured accounts of savings and
loans, building and loans and homestead associations operated under
state law.29 Thus, through the FSLIC, the FHLBB had some regulatory
authority over those state institutions that were insured by the FSLIC.
B. The Savings and Loan Crisis
The FHLBB was abolished in the wake of the S&L crisis. While the
reasons for the crisis are many and varied,3" this section will focus on
those causes related to the operations of the FHLBB.
Many believe that the S&L crisis resulted at least in part from inade-
quate supervision of thrifts.31 In keeping with the Reagan Administra-
tion's policy of diminishing government intrusion, the Treasury
Department and the thrift regulators convinced Congress in the early
1980's to scale back government regulation of the S&L industry,3 2 thus
reducing the number of savings and loan examiners to an inadequate
level. This lack of supervision, coupled with the deregulation of thrift
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1988). See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
Although the FHLBB had the power to regulate the S&Ls, it delegated a great deal of
day-to-day supervision of the S&Ls to Federal Home Loan Bank employees. See House
Report, supra note 18, at 453, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 249.
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A)-(B) (1988). For a discussion of similar OTS pow-
ers, see infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(B) (1988). For a discussion of the FSLIC as conserva-
tor, see infra note 27. For a discussion of the OTS as conservator, see infra notes 101-123
and accompanying text.
27. The FHLBB could also appoint the FSLIC as conservator or receiver of a federal
savings association. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1) (1988). As conservator or receiver, the
FSLIC could take control of an association's assets and operations, merge the association
with another insured association, or organize a new federal association to take over the
assets of the seized association. See id.§ 1729(b) (1)(A). The FSLIC could choose which-
ever option it deemed to be in the best interest of the seized institution and the SLIC See
id.; see also Note, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers Over Savings Associationr" Does FIRREA
Make it "SAIF?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L
Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S381 (1991) (discussing
FSLIC's successor, SAIF).
28. See 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a)(1) (1988).
29. See id. § 1726(a)(2) (1988).
30. For a full discussion of the causes leading to the S&L crisis, see Note, Causes of
the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regula-
tion, The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S301 (1991).
31. See House Report, supra note 18, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 97.
32. See id.
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investment activities,33 led to an increase in "fraudulent and risky activi-
ties."'  Many institutions subsequently suffered great financial losses
while regulators appeared to be unaware that problems existed.3"
Another cause of the S&L crisis stemmed from the dual missions of
the FHLBB. The FHLBB, the chief regulator of savings and loan as-
sociations, "perceived its role as that of an industry promoter. '3 6 The
Board also administered the FSLIC, however, and therefore was charged
with protecting the industry's deposit insurance fund.37 This potential
conflict of interest within the FHLBB-its role as an industry promoter
versus its role as an industry insurer-inevitably led to problems.3" In
fact, witnesses testifying before the House Banking Committee asserted
that the Board's main priority was to promote the thrift industry39 at the
expense of the "captive deposit insurance fund. ' These witnesses
pointed to the Board's relaxation of capital standards as well as to a scar-
city of enforcement actions against thrift owners as evidence of their
claims.4" The FHLBB, it seems, may have been more interested in pro-
moting the industry than in protecting the insurance fund.42 This con-
flict was a major force leading to the decline of the FHLBB and giving
rise to the newly designed OTS.
II. A SELECTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE OTS
A. Formation and Structure of the OTS
President Bush signed FIRREA into law on August 9, 1989.41 Pursu-
ant to FIRREA, the FHLBB was disbanded at the close of business on
October 7, 1989, and the OTS was officially established on October 8,
1989.' One of the main purposes of establishing the OTS was to sepa-
33. Deregulation of the thrift industry occurred when Congress enacted the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDMCA"), Pub.
L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in various sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.). See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Finan-
cial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S301, S305-10 (1991).
34. House Report, supra note 18, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News at 97.
35. See id. at 301-2, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 97-8.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 302, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 98.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id. The FHLBB's relaxation of capital standards and failure to use its enforce-
ment powers against thrift associations supports this theory. See id.
43. See Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself- Revising and Reshaping the En-
forcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St. L. J. 1117, 1133 (1989).
44. See FIRREA, § 401(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 354 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1437(a)(2)).
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rate the credit, insurance and regulatory functions45 that had previously
all been under the control of the FHLBB.4 Congress was painfully
aware that concentrating these functions may have led to conflicts of in-
terest that contributed to the S&L crisis.47 Its goal was to create an
agency with enhanced enforcement powers that would concentrate solely
on regulating the industry."
Organizationally, the OTS is an agency within the Department of the
Treasury,49 headed by a Director under the general oversight of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury.'o The Secretary may not, however, intervene in
matters before the Director unless so permitted by law.5"
The Director of the OTS is appointed by the President with the ap-
proval of the Senate. 2 Although the Director may serve only one five-
year term, he may remain at the post after his term has expired until a
successor has been appointed. 3 Except for those powers that were ex-
45. See House Report, supra note 18, at 307, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 103.
46. See id.
47. See id., reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 106; supra notes 30-
35 and accompanying text.
48. See House Report, supra note 18, at 311, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 107. The insurance and credit functions were given to the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("EDIC") and the Federal Home Loan Banks ("FHLB")
respectively. See id. at 310, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 106.
49. See FIRREA, § 301(3)(a), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462a(a)).
50. See id. § 301(3)(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(b)(1)).
The Director is required to report annually to Congress, detailing any changes he has
made or may make regarding the OTS' district offices, including "the geographic alloca-
tion of the office's resources and personnel used to carry out examination and supervision
functions." Id. § 301(3)(f), 103 Stat. at 279 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(f)).
Congressional budget analysts have criticized the OTS for failing to provide timely
updates on the condition of the thrift industry. See Cope, Dearth of Numbers from OT
Makes Thrift Picture Hazy, Am. Banker, July 16, 1990, at 8, col. 1. From March 1990
through July 1990, the OTS failed to publish any statistics from monthly thrift financial
reports. See id. This lack of information makes it difficult to determine the success of the
rescue efforts or to assess the financial needs of the Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC"). See id. For a discussion of RTC, see Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation:
Waste Management and The S&L Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S339
(1991). Lack of information also hinders efforts to increase the strength of the thrift
industry because investors need information to determine the health of certain savings
associations before they will invest in thrifts. See Cope, supra, at 8, col. 1.
51. See FIRREA, § 301(3)(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462a(b)(3)).
52. See id. § 301(3)(c)(1), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(c)(1)).
The Director must be a citizen of the United States. See id.
53. See id. § 301(3)(c)(4), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(c)(4)).
The statute also provided that, upon creation of the oTs and abolition of the FHLBB,
the then chairman of the FHLBB, M. Danny Wall, would continue as the Director of the
01S until his term expired. See id. § 301(3)(c)(5), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1462a(c)(5). In November 1989, however, Mr. Wall resigned. See 8 Annual
Review of Banking Law 1989, at 15.
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pressly transferred to other agencies or repealed by FIRREA,5 4 the Di-
rector retains the powers granted to the chairman of the FHLBB.55
B. The OTS' Regulatory Powers
The OTS has many varied powers and duties, all of which are aimed at
ensuring a strong, viable thrift industry. This section will examine the
OTS' most important and useful powers and will compare these powers
to similar powers that had been available to the FHLBB.
1. Capital Requirements
One of the OTS' most important regulatory powers is its ability to
enforce minimum capital standards for savings associations.56 In con-
trast, before the enactment of FIRREA, the FHLBB set whatever mini-
mum capital requirements it deemed appropriate,57 based on the
circumstances of individual savings associations.5"
The OTS can similarly prescribe minimum regulatory capital stan-
dards that apply industry-wide,59 and can require more stringent capital
standards for particular thrift institutions if their condition warrants
stronger compliance.' These requirements force savings associations to
maintain an adequate level of capital under three standards: a risk-based
capital standard, a leverage capital standard, and a tangible capital
standard.6
1
54. See FIRREA, § 301(3)(e), 103 Stat. at 278-9 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462a(e)).
55. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
56. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 16, at 1034, 1036. Congress
enacted the capital standards to discourage thrifts from investing in risky activities; a
thrift had to comply with higher capital standards before engaging in such activities. See
House Report, supra note 18, at 429, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
86, 225. Additionally, Congress believed that capital standards acted like deductibles in
insurance policies, and therefore less of the deposit insurance fund was at risk. See Id.
Finally, Congress believed that because more of the thrift owners' money was at risk, the
owners would be more careful. See id.
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(1) (1988). These capital standards were originally set at
five percent of assets. Subsequently the FHLBB reduced the standards to four percent of
assets and finally to three percent. See House Report, supra note 18 at 298, reprinted in
1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94.
58. See id § 1464(s)(2) (1988).
If a thrift failed to maintain its minimum capital standards, the FHLBB could find this
to be an unsafe or unsound practice. See id. § 1464(s)(3). Such a finding empowered the
FHLBB either to place the thrift in conservatorship or to issue a cease-and-desist order
requiring the institution to raise its capital. See id. § 1464(d)(2)(A). The FHLBB could
also issue a directive to any institution that failed to meet the minimum capital require-
ments, see id. § 1464(s)(4)(A), requiring the thrift to submit an acceptable plan to in-
crease the association's level of capital to minimum standards. See id.
59. See FIRREA, § 301(5)(s)(2), 103 Stat. at 303 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(s)(2)). These standards are set as a percentage of total assets. See id.
60. See id. § 301(5)(s)(4), 103 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(4)).
61. See id. § 301(5)(t)(1)(A), 103 Stat. at 303-4 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(1)(A)). For a more detailed discussion of the minimum capital standards, and
for a description of the three standards, see Anthony Providenti's section of survey. FIR-
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If a thrift fails to meet minimum capital requirements, the OTS re-
quires the thrift to submit a capital plan proposing a strategy for reaching
the minimum requirements.62 If the OTS rejects a thrift's plan or if a
thrift fails to comply with an approved plan, the OTS may treat this as an
unsafe or unsound practice,63 and therefore may find grounds to seize the
thrift.64
The OTS has been strictly enforcing these new capital requirements65
and has been extremely selective in approving capital plans. As of March
27, 1990, the OTS had ruled on 172 capital plans." Of these, only
fourty-nine were approved.67 The 123 thrifts that had their plans re-
jected were expected to be turned over to the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion ("RTC")6" or face other enforcement or supervisory action.69
Thrift operators have strongly denounced the OTS for its strict en-
REA requires the OTS to enforce minimum capital standards at least as stringent as
those of the Comptroller of the Currency, the regulator for national banks. See FIR-
REA, § 301(5)(t)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1)(C)).
Risk-based capital standards may exceed those standards of national banks to reflect in-
terest rate risks or other possible risks. See id. § 301(5)(t)(2)(C), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(C)). A thrift must maintain the leverage standard of
capital at not less than three percent of total assets, and tangible capital at a level of 1.5%
or more of total assets. See id. § 301(5)(t)(2)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(A)-(B)).
62. See id. § 301(5)(t)(6)(A)Cii)(_I), 103 Stat. at 307 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(6)(A) (ii)(Il)). The OTS has the additional power to limit the asset growth of
any savings association that fails the minimum capital requirements prior to January 1,
1991 by issuing a capital directive. See id. § 301 (5)(t)(6)(A)(ii), 103 Stat. at 307-08 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6)(A)(ii)). The capital directive will restrict payment of
dividends and compensation as the Director deems appropriate. See id. at 308. The OTS
has the discretion to limit the sanctions on any thrift that fails to meet the capital require-
ments, but the asset growth limitation must still apply. The OTS will approve a capital
exemption only if: (1) it poses no significant risk to the thrift (2) the management of the
thrift is competent; (3) the savings association is for the most part in compliance with all
applicable statutes, orders, regulations, directives and supervisory agreements; and (4) the
institution's management has not engaged in practices that have jeopardized the safety or
soundness of the institution. See id. § 301(5)(t)(7)(C)(i)(I)-(IV), 103 Stat. at 309 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(7)(C)(i)(I)-(IV)).
63. See id § 301(5)(t)(7)(E), 103 Stat. at 309 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(7)(E)).
64. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
65. See Karmin, Oh, That Costly S & L Mesw" Ineptitude and Turmoil are Driving Up
the Tab for Taxpayers, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 9, 1990, at 37.
66. See Oversight Hearings on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervi-
sion, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong. 2nd Sess. 486 (1990) [hereinafter Statement of Salvatore R_
Martoche].
67. See id.
68. See Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and The S&L
Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death
and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 5339, S344-45 (1991).
69. See Statement of Salvatore R. Martoche, supra note 66, at 486.
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forcement of these standards.7" Critics of OTS, who claim that harsh
capital standards will ultimately close some savings associations that
would otherwise survive,7" believe that the continued imposition of these
standards will ultimately increase the amount paid by taxpayers as a re-
sult of the S&L crisis.72 These critics, including thrift operators them-
selves, contend that before seizing troubled associations, the OTS should
allow associations that have not submitted acceptable capital plans a last
shot at raising their levels of capital.7 3
The OTS counters that strong restrictions must be imposed to mini-
mize the costs to taxpayers.74 The OTS claims that many of the institu-
tions that critics allege would survive with less stringent capital
restrictions are, in reality, terminally sick institutions that would ulti-
mately collapse at a later date. By closing the thrifts now, the OTS ar-
gues, higher future costs are averted.75 Additionally, the OTS asserts
that those thrifts that do not have a reasonable chance of survival should
be removed from the industry.76 The prolonged survival of weaker insti-
tutions is problematic because weaker institutions would likely offer
higher interest rates in order to attract deposits.77 These higher rates, in
turn, would result in higher overall funding costs to the industry, thereby
impairing the strength of sound thrifts.78
2. The Qualified Thrift Lender Test
In addition to imposing capital requirements, the OTS requires thrifts
to maintain a minimum percentage of their assets in qualified thrift in-
vestments-specifically, in home finance and related activities.7 9 The
Qualified Thrift Lender Test ("QTL test"), as set out under the adminis-
tration of the FHLBB, required a thrift to maintain an average of at least
sixty percent of tangible assets 0 in qualified thrift investments in three
70. See McCoy & Schmitt, Federal Regulators Brutally Tough on Sick S&Ls Ideas to
Stay Afloat, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1990, at A2, col. 2.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. Critics also believe that the strict enforcement policy has more to do with
political pressure on the OTS than with sound regulatory policy. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Statement of Salvatore R. Martoche, supra note 66, at 487.
77. See id.
78. See id. The OTS has also developed a "Capital Enhancement Program" to help
savings associations raise capital and avoid being placed into conservatorship. See id. at
488. Employees in the OTS' twelve district offices attempt to bring investors together
with savings associations that need external capital financing. See id. The employees also
work closely with the thrifts to develop effective marketing strategies and materials. See
id.
79. See FIRREA, § 301(10)(m)(1)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 331-2 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1)(A)-(B)).
80. Tangible assets are defined as the total assets of an insured association less good-
will and any other intangible assets. See 12 C.F.R. § 583.27 (1989).
[Vol. 59S370
out of four quarters annually and in two out of every three years.8" The
OTS will use this test until July 1, 1991, at which time the 0TS will
increase the requirement to seventy percent of portfolio assets82 on a con-
stant basis.8 3 Additionally, an association will be required to satisfy the
seventy percent minimum by a weekly or daily average for a two-year
period beginning July 1, 1991 and for each two-year period thereafter."
As of August 9, 1990, new investments or activities of a thrift institu-
tion that fails the QTL test will be limited to those allowable for national
banks and savings associations alike.8 5 Such a thrift will also be prohib-
ited from establishing new branches in areas where national banks are
prohibited from establishing new branches.86 Further, it will be denied
advances from any Federal Home Loan Bank and required to pay divi-
dends in accordance with rules and regulations for national banks.87 Fi-
nally, a thrift failing the QTL test must repay any outstanding advances
owed to any Federal Home Loan Bank as quickly and safely as possible,
and, three years after failing the QTL test, will be required to divest itself
of all investments and activities not authorized for both banks and sav-
ings associations. 8
3. Cease-and-Desist Power
FIRREA has significantly expanded the OTS' enforcement powers.8 9
For example, the OTS may issue cease-and-desist orders against any
shareholder, consultant, or joint venture partner who participates in the
81. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(o)(1) (1988) (repealed by FIRREA § 407). Additionally,
under the control of the FHLBB, a thrift failing the QTL was still permitted to receive
advances from a Federal Home Loan Bank. These advances, however, were limited to
the percentage of qualified thrift investments held by the institution. See id. § 1430(e)(1)(1988). Therefore, if a thrift held 50% of its tangible assets in qualified thrift investments,
the thrift could receive 50% of the advances the association would have been entitled to
had the QTL test been met.
82. 'The term 'portfolio assets' means, with respect to any savings association, the
total assets of the savings association, less the sum of: (i) goodwill and other intangible
assets; (ii) the value of property used by the savings association to conduct its business;
and (iii) liquid assets of the type required to be maintained under section 6 of the Home
Owners Loan Act, in an amount not exceeding the amount equal to 10% of the savings
association's total assets." See FIRREA, § 303(a), 103 Stat. at 343-4 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(4)(B)).
83. See id. § 303(a), 103 Stat. at 343-4 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(l)(A)-(B)).
84. See id. § 303(a), 103 Stat. at 344 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1)(B)).
85. See id. § 301(10)(m)(3)(B)(i)(I), 103 Stat. at 332 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(m)(3)(B) (i)(r)).
86. See id. § 301(10)(m)(3)(B)(i)(II), 103 Stat. at 332 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(m)(3)(B) (i)(II)).
87. See id. § 301(l0)(m)(3)(B)(i)(III)-(IV), 103 Stat. at 333 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(m) (3)(B)(i)(III)-(IV)).
88. See id. § 301(10)(m)(3)(B)(i)(III)-(V), 103 Stat. at 333 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(m) (3)(B)(i)(III)-(IV)).
89. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 16, at 1028.
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thrift's affairs.' ° It may also issue a cease-and-desist order against any
independent contractor-such as an accountant, attorney, or appraiser-
who knowingly or recklessly participates in any violation of a law or
regulation, breach of a fiduciary duty, or unsafe or unsound practice that
has caused (or likely will cause) more than a minimal financial loss or
that will have a significant adverse effect upon the thrift.9 '
The OTS is authorized to take any enforcement action92 against any
affiliated individual, even if that individual has resigned, been fired, or
has been otherwise removed.93 The OTS may bring an action against the
party up to six years after the person has severed ties with the thrift.94
By contrast, the FHLBB was only permitted to bring enforcement ac-
tions against individuals who were still connected with the savings
association.95
The OTS is also authorized to issue temporary cease-and-desist or-
ders.96 This authority was greatly enhanced relative to similar powers of
the FHLBB. FIRREA has reduced the burden of proof required for is-
suing a temporary cease-and-desist order.97 The OTS must find that the
violation is likely to cause a significant9" dissipation of assets. 99 The
FHLBB was required to show that the unsafe or unsound practice was
likely to cause insolvency or a substantial-as opposed to significant-
dissipation of assets, or was likely to seriously weaken the condition of
the thrift.c0
C. Conservatorship Powers
The OTS' greatest regulatory power is its authority to seize federal and
state-chartered savings associations and place them under conservator-
90. See FIRREA, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
91. See id. § 204(f), 103 Stat. at 193 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813). Although
the FHLBB had the power to issue cease-and-desist orders, the categories of individual
persons subject to the FHLBB's power were much more limited. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)
(2)(A) (1988) (repealed by FIRREA § 407).
92. Once the cease-and-desist order has been issued, the OTS may require the institu-
tion or the affiliated party to remedy the unsafe or unsound practice or condition by: (i)
making restitution, reimbursement or indemnification against loss if the association or
affiliated party was unjustly enriched, or if the violation involved a reckless disregard for
the law, regulation, or prior order of the OTS; (ii) restricting the growth of the thrift; (iii)
disposing of any loan or asset involved; (iv) rescinding agreements or contracts; (v) re-
scinding employment of qualified employees or officers; or (vi) taking any action the OTS
deems proper. See FIRREA, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b)).
93. See id. § 905(a), 103 Stat. at 459 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)).
94. See id.
95. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e),(f),(g) (1988) (repealed by FIRREA § 407).
96. See FIRREA, § 902(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. "Significant" includes anything greater than a "minimal or nominal dis-
sipation of assets." H.R. Rep. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 439, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 432, 478.
100. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(3)(A) (1988).
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ship or into receivership.'01 The OTS may, without notice or a hearing,
seize a federal savings association if any of a number of conditions is
met.1" Additionally, the OTS may seize a federal savings association if,
by resolution of the thrift's board of directors or its members, the thrift
consents to the seizure.10 3 The OTS is also authorized to seize a federal
thrift that loses its membership in any Federal Home Loan Bank or
whose accounts cease to be insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"). °'
The OTS may seize a state thrift only upon the decision of a state
banking official that one or more of the reasons specified for seizure ex-
ist.os There are, however, two situations in which the OTS may proceed
101. See FIRREA, § 301(5)(d)(2)(A),(C), 103 Stat. at 290, 291 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2) (A),(C)).
102. See id. § 301(5)(d)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 290 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2)(A)). These conditions include: (i) insolvency, such that the assets of the
association are less than its obligations to its creditors and others, including its members;
(ii) a substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due either to a violation of law or regula-
tions or to any unsafe or unsound practice or practices; (ii) an unsafe or unsound condi-
tion for the transaction of business, including having substantially insufficient capital; (iv)
willful violation of a cease-and-desist order that has become final; (v) concealment of
books, papers, records, or assets of the savings association or refusal to submit books,
papers, records, or affairs of the association for inspection to any examiner or to any
lawful agent of the Director, (vi) a likelihood that the association will not be able to meet
the demands of its depositors or pay its obligations in the normal course of business; (vii)
the association's incurrence (or likely incurrence of losses that will deplete all or substan-
tially all of its capital and there is no reasonable prospect for the replenishment of the
capital of the association without Federal assistance; or (viii) a violation of law or regula-
tions or an unsafe or unsound practice or condition that is likely to cause insolvency or
substantial dissipation of assets or earnings, or is likely to weaken the condition of the
association or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of its depositors. See id. at 290-
91.
Although the OTS has the authority to seize a federal savings association unilaterally
and without notice, the thrift has a right to bring an action within thirty days in a United
States district court requesting that the OTS remove the appointed conservator or re-
ceiver. See id. § 301(5)(d)(2)(E), 103 Stat. at 292 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)
(2)(E)); infra notes 151-171 and accompanying text.
103. See FIRREA, § 301(5)(d)(2)(B)(i), 103 Stat. at 291 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2) (B)(i)).
104. See id. § 301(5)(d)(2)(B)(ii), 103 Stat. at 291 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2)(B)(ii)).
105. See id. § 301(5)(d)(2)(D)(i), 103 Stat. at 292 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2)(D)(i)). The grounds for seizure of a state-chartered thrift by the OTS are as
follows:
(i) insolvency, such that the assets of the association are less than its obligations to its
creditors and others, including its members; (fi) a substantial dissipation of assets or earn-
ings due to any violation of law or regulations or to any unsafe or unsound practice or
practices; (iii) an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business, including having sub-
stantially insufficient capital; (iv) the association is not likely to be able to meet the de-
mands of its depositors or pay its obligations in the normal course of business; (v) the
savings association has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or substan-
tially all of its capital and there is no reasonable prospect for the savings association's
capital to be replenished without federal assistance; or (vi) there is a violation of law or
regulations or an unsafe or unsound practice or condition which is likely to cause insol-
vency or substantial dissipation of assets or earnings or is likely to weaken the condition
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without state approval: 1) where the OTS notifies the state that valid
reasons exist to seize a specific thrift and the state fails to respond within
thirty days;"11 and 2) where the state does respond, the OTS may none-
theless seize the thrift upon an OTS answer to the state response.
107
A thrift seized by the OTS is handed over to the RTC. Pursuant to
FIRREA, the RTC will manage and resolve01 all thrifts seized between
January 1, 1989 and August 9, 1992.109 The RTC is also authorized to
dispose of a seized thrift's assets.110 Any thrift seized prior to January 1,
1989 is managed and resolved by the FSLIC Resolution Fund, which is
under the control of the FDIC.11  Thrift failures that occur after August
9, 1992 will be resolved by the FDIC. 12
Under an agreement with the RTC, the OTS has the authority to look
for buyers for a thrift before seizing it." 3 This procedure avoids placing
many thrifts in the hands of the RTC and thus allows thrifts to be sold
intact to private individuals while still attractive to potential buyers.1 4
The plan allows for a savings association to be sold intact to private indi-
viduals rather than allowing it to deteriorate under the RTC's control.I 5
The OTS has come under strong criticism for seizing institutions and
placing them under RTC control. 6 Analysts have criticized the OTS
for placing thrifts in the hands of the RTC when buyers have not yet
been found or sought.1 7 Observers believe the OTS has been placing
of the association or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of its depositors. See Id.
§ 301(5)(d)(2)(C), 103 Stat. at 291-92 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(C)).
"Substantially insufficient capital" includes amounts greater than zero. See House Re-
port, supra note 18, at 427-28, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 223-
24. This interpretation of substantially insufficient capital gives the OTS the power to
take early action, before an institution lapses into insolvency. See id.
106. See FIRREA, § 301(5)(d)(2)(D)(ii), 103 Stat. at 292 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2) (D)(ii)).
107. See id.
108. To resolve seized thrifts, the RTC may (i) require a merger or consolidation of
institutions, see FIRREA, § 501(21A)(b)(1 1)(A)(iii), 103 Stat. at 372 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 144la(b)(11)(A)(iii)); (ii) organize federal savings associations chartered by the
OTS Director, see id. § 501(21A)(b)(11)(A)(iv), 103 Stat. at 373 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b) (1l)(A)(iv)); and (iii) acquire voting and nonvoting equity securities
and warrants or other participation interests in the institutions or their assets. See id.
§ 501(21A)(b)(10)(H), 103 Stat. at 371 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(10)(H)).
109. See id. § 501(21A)(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b) (3)(A)(ii)(I)).
110. See id. § 501(21A)(b)(3)(c)(i), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b)(3)(c)(i)).
111. See id. § 501(21A)(b)(6), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b)(6)).
112. See id. § 404(9), 103 Stat. at 363 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437(9)).
113. See Cope, OTS to Seek Bids Before Seizing Sick Institutions, Am. Banker, July 11,
1990, at 1, col. 5.
114. See id. at 21, col. 3-4.
115. See id. at 21, col. 1.
116. See Klinkerman, OTS Swamps RTC Plan for Coordination, Am. Banker, June 5,
1990, at 1, col. 1.
117. See id.
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thrifts under RTC control quickly to remove itself from the thrift crisis
and allow itself to cut staff and give more attention to viable thrifts." '8
The OTS' former chief economist, James Barth, has criticized the OTS
for dumping savings associations on the RTC with full knowledge that
"when the red ink spills, the RTC will get most of the blame."" 9 Ac-
cordingly, critics maintain that the OTS' present policy of rapidly plac-
ing many thrifts into the hands of the RTC is creating chaos and may
actually drive up the cost of the thrift bailout.u"O These critics believe
that placing many thrifts into prolonged RTC conservatorship despoils
such thrifts and significantly lowers their ultimate selling price. 21 While
the OTS has responded to these charges by claiming that it has placed
into conservatorship only those thrifts that need to be so placed,1" critics
have countered that, in reality, many of the seized thrifts did not yet fit
the takeover criteria.123
D. Day-to-Day Operations of the OTS
1. Limitations on One-Borrower Lending
FIRREA generally caps lending to one borrower at fifteen percent of
the thrift's unimpaired capital."2 FIRREA does, however, provide for
an exemption allowing thrifts to lend up to thirty percent of unimpaired
capital subject to a complicated approval process." s The OTS has tem-
porarily relaxed these limits, however. 126 A temporary regulation allows
thrifts that meet the fully-phased-in capital requirements of 1995121 to
lend as much as sixty percent of unimpaired capital to a single borrower
if the money is to be used for domestic residential construction. 21
Savings associations may receive the exemption merely by notifying
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1, col. 1.
121. See id.
122. See Klinkerman, supra note 116, at 1, col. 1.
123. See id. Critics have pointed to the takeovers of Southwest Savings Association,
Santa Barbara Savings & Loan Association, and Home Owners Savings Bank as proof
that many seizures have been unnecessary. Each of these savings associations had be-
tween $3.6 billion and $6.5 billion in assets when seized. See id.
124. See Cope, O7S Will Relax Limitations on Single Borrowers, Banking Week, June
11, 1990, at 1, col. 4. Unimpaired capital includes the amount of unimpaired common
stock and perpetual preferred stock outstanding. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.100(a) (1989).
125. See FIRREA, § 301(5)(u)(2), 103 Stat. at 310-1 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(u)(2)).
126. See Cope, supra note 124, at 1, col. 4.
127. See Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned- Statutory Overview of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, in Annual Survey
of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59
Fordham L. Rev. S323, S330-32 (1991).
128. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.93(g)(1)(i) (1991). The 60% figure will drop to 30% at the
start of 1991 and will then return to 15% by December 31, 1991. See id. § 563.93(g)(5)
(1991).
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the OTS. 129 Prior to the issuance of this temporary regulation, there was
some discussion among OTS lawyers on whether this liberal exemption
was ultra vires.130 Therefore, they sought and received Treasury Depart-
ment approval of the temporary regulation. 3 ' With this approval, the
OTS believes that FIRREA permits this temporary exemption. 32
The OTS has faced criticism for amending these restrictions, with
some critics calling for even fewer restrictions1 33 and others denouncing
the new regulation as too liberal.13 1 Critics calling for fewer restrictions
propose that the OTS permit a certain number of thrifts that do not meet
current capital standards to benefit from the relaxation of the limits. 3 5
Under this proposal, any well-run, profitable thrift could take advantage
of the relaxed limitations. 136 The critics who have denounced the new
regulation as being too liberal, however, claim that the loosening of re-
strictions will lead to "a new wave of risky lending."'137
While it is possible that this liberal exemption could lead to an increase
in risky lending, this appears doubtful. The OTS has broad regulatory
powers, and so long as it continues to act as a diligent policeman, the
loosening of the restrictions will not lead to an increase in risky lending;
rather, only a decrease in the OTS' supervision of thrifts will lead to
renewed risky lending.
2. Payment of Dividends
The OTS has developed a plan whereby it would allow undercapital-
ized thrifts to pay out small dividends 38 to investors on a case-by-case
basis, thereby helping struggling thrifts to attract investors. 139 The new
rule also places restrictions on dividends that can be paid by institutions
that meet current capital standards but fall short of the fully-phased-in
requirements of 1995. 4° These thrifts may issue dividends of between
129. See Cope, supra note 124, at 11, col. 1.
130. See id.
131. See 55 Fed. Reg. 28,144 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 545, 563).
132. See Cope, supra note 124, at 11, col. 1.
133. See Garsson, OTS' Easing of Loan Limit Seen as Feeble, Am. Banker, July 11,
1990, at 1, col. 1. Many of the critics calling for looser restrictions believe that the revised
limit will do little if anything to help struggling thrifts because, for the most part, they
will not qualify for such reduced restrictions. See id.
Other critics assert that the Department of Treasury insisted on a limited regulation
such as the one that has been developed, see Cope, supra note 126, at 11, col. 2, and that
the OTS is merely a second-rate regulator, a puppet of the Department of Treasury and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. See Garsson, at 20, col. 4.
134. See Cope, OTS Proposes to Streamline Operations, Am. Banker, June 18, 1990, at
8, col. 2.
135. See Cope, supra note 124, at 1, 11, col. 1.
136. See id.
137. See Cope, supra note 134, at 8, col. 2.
138. See Cope, OTS Planning to Ease Bans on Payouts, Am. Banker, June 22, 1990, at
2, col. 1.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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twenty-five percent and seventy-five percent of net income, depending on
how close the thrift is to the 1995 capital requirements. 4 '
3. OTS' Operating Costs
To lower its operating costs, the OTS has devised a plan to streamline
its operations.142 The plan calls for five of its twelve district offices to
become regional offices that would manage the other districts. 43 The
remaining district offices would then be pared back. "' Each region
would be run by a manager who would direct policy14 and who would
have the authority to place field examiners where they are most
needed.'" Additionally, antifraud and enforcement squads would oper-
ate from the regional offices, as would interest-rate risk and capital-mar-
ket officers.147
Complete implementation of this restructuring plan is not expected
until, at the earliest, the end of 1991.1" The restructuring should ease
the costs to the thrift industry, which finances the operation of the
OTS. 49 In the second quarter of 1990 alone, the thrift industry contrib-
uted $54.2 million in revenues to the OTS.15"
E. Litigation Involving the OTS
1. Lincoln Savings & Loan v. OTS1 1
The Lincoln Savings & Loan litigation arose when the FHLBB placed
Lincoln Savings first in conservatorship and then under receivership." 2
The F-LBB appointed a conservator for Lincoln because it determined
that the thrift was in an unsafe and unsound condition and consequently
141. See id.
142. See Cope, supra note 134, at 8, col. 2.
143. See id. The twelve district offices, as initially created, were located in Atlanta,
Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Des Moines, Indianapolis, Jersey City, Pittsburgh,
San Francisco, Seattle and Topeka. See id. Under the proposal, the district offices in
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Jersey City and San Francisco would become regional offices.
See id. The Jersey City regional office would control Boston and Pittsburgh. The Chi-
cago office would control Cincinnati and Indianapolis, while Dallas would control Des
Moines and Topeka. San Francisco would control only the Seattle district, and Atlanta,
while being raised to a regional office, would not control any additional districts. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.; Note, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers Over Savings Associations. Does FIR-
REA Make it "SAIF?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The
S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordhamn L. Rev. S381, S389-90 (1991).
150. See Cope, supra note 134, at 8.
151. 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
152. See id. at 902-03. As the successor of the FHLBB, the OTS replaced the FHLBB
as the defendant in this case. See id. at 902. The plaintiffs were the American Continen-
tal Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, Lincoln Savings and Loan Association.
See id.
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had incurred a substantial dissipation of assets. 153 The plaintiffs con-
tended that they had operated Lincoln on a sound financial basis at all
times154 and that the FHLBB acted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner by appointing a conservator.1 55
The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's actions had to be viewed by
the court under a de novo standard.156 The court, however, in upholding
the FHLBB's decision, applied a standard of review affording judicial
deference to the FHLBB's judgement.157 Under this standard, the court
would have to find the actions of the FHLBB or the OTS arbitrary and
capricious in order to remove the conservator or receiver. 5 8
The court also stated that this deferential level of review was necessary
for the effective regulation of the S&L industry. 159 The ruling in this case
appears to maintain the standard of review traditionally applied to
FHLBB actions. Therefore, although the ruling did not expand the OTS'
powers, it left intact the OTS' already broad seizure powers.
2. Franklin Savings Association v. OTS'"
The Franklin Savings Association litigation arose out of the OTS' ap-
pointment of a conservator for Franklin Savings Association. The first
issue addressed by the court was what evidence could be considered in
determining whether the OTS' seizure was justified. 16 1 FIRREA calls
for judicial review "upon the merits"' 62 , and the OTS argued that "upon
the merits" meant that the court could review only the administrative
record, which was compiled by the OTS itself.' 63 Franklin argued, how-
ever, that outside evidence received by the court must be considered.'64
The court interpreted "upon the merits" to mean that the court would
continue to apply an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review,' 65
thus requiring the court to uphold the OTS' decisions if there was a rea-
153. See id. at 903.
154. See id. at 904.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 905.
158. See id. According to the court, the FHLBB or the OTS need show only a reason-
able factual basis for its belief that at least one of the grounds for seizure existed. See id.
Under this holding, it seems likely that courts will consistently rule in favor of the OTS
because the review by the court is controlled by the administrative record as established
by the OTS. Therefore, it will be difficult for a thrift challenging an OTS seizure to
provide enough evidence to show that the OTS acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The
action of the OTS would need to be of such magnitude that the court could spot it in the
review of the OTS-created administrative record.
159. See id.
160. 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990).
161. See id. at 1096.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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sonable basis for the action."' 6 On its face, this standard seems to coin-
cide with the type of review set out in Lincoln. The Franklin court,
however, decided that the record on which the review would be consid-
ered should be expanded to include evidence outside the administrative
record. 16 7 The court was quick to add that this holding did not change
the OTS' power to place a thrift in conservatorship ex parte and without
notice,'68 but that after such ex parte seizure, the seized institution must
eventually be permitted to present its side of the evidence.' 69
Under this new interpretation, the district court held that the OTS'
determination that Franklin was engaging in unsound and unsafe prac-
tices was arbitrary and capricious. 70 The court considered evidence,
presented by Franklin, that the federal regulators who examined the
thrift lacked sufficient training to analyze its operations and therefore
had no reasonable basis for determining that Franklin's methods were a
threat to the safety of the institution. 17'
Therefore, although the court still required plaintiffs to show that the
OTS' actions were arbitrary and capricious, the Franklin court made it
easier for plaintiffs to meet the standard. By allowing a seized thrift to
introduce evidence outside the administrative record presented by the
OTS, the court looked at actual allegations that the OTS acted arbitrarily
and capriciously. Previously, where only the administrative record as
established by the OTS or FHLBB was considered, it was much more
difficult for the court to find arbitrary and capricious behavior. The level
of arbitrary and capricious activities by the agencies would therefore
have had to be at such a level as to be clearly evident.
Additionally, Franklin is important because it may serve to make the
OTS more wary when considering whether to seize a thrift. The OTS
will need to determine whether a seized thrift will have valid evidence
proving the OTS' actions to be improper. Although Franklin did not
formally reduce the OTS' powers to seize an institution, it appears likely
that this will be the result if Franklin is followed.
CONCLUSION
Under FIRREA, the OTS has been granted broad authority. Because
the OTS has come under strong criticism, how the OTS uses this power
effectively will decide not only the future of the thrift industry, but quite
possibly the future of the OTS itself. There has already been legislation
166. See id. at 1097.
167. See id. This expanded review would not be a de novo review of the evidence,
however, because the OTS' opinion would still carry a great deal of weight. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. Despite this new interpretation, the court upheld the OTS' presumption of
validity when taking an action against a thrift. See id. at 1096. Therefore, Franklin still
had the burden of proving that the OTS' decision was arbitrary and capricious. See id.
170. See id. at 1128.
171. See id. at 1106-07.
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proposed to abolish the OTS and combine it with the Office of the Comp-
troller of Currency. 72 In the future, it may become prudent to provide
for a centralized agency that controls both thrifts and commercial banks.
In the short run, however, it is important that legislators afford the OTS
an opportunity to carry out its mandate and that regulators monitor its
future effectiveness in restructuring the thrift industry.
Robert Cooper
172. See Knight, Calls Mount to Abolish Thrift Office: Backers Say Move Would Save
Money, Washington Post, January 18, 1990, at Cl, col. 2.
